Anecdotal reports and systematic research highlight the prevalence of "narrow network" plans on the Affordable Care Act (ACA)'s Health Insurance Marketplaces. At the same time, marketplace premiums during 2014-2016 were much lower than projected. Using detailed data on the breadth of both hospital and physician networks, we study the prevalence of narrow networks and quantify the association between network breadth and premiums. Controlling for many potentially confounding factors, a plan with narrow physician and hospital networks is 16 percent cheaper than a plan with broad networks for both; narrowing just one is associated with a 6-9 percent decrease in premiums. Narrow-network plans also have a sizeable impact on federal outlays, as they depress the "second-lowest silver premium" linked to subsidy amounts. Holding all else constant, we estimate federal subsidies would have been 10.8 percent higher in 2014 had marketplaces required all plans to offer broad provider networks. Narrow networks are a promising source of potential savings for other commercial insurance segments, although the long-term impacts on provider costs and viability remain unknown.
Introduction
From 1999 to 2013, employer-sponsored health insurance premiums grew at an average annual rate of 7.7 percent, 4.7 percent faster than the average annual rate of growth in US GDP per capita.(1)(2) Premiums for plans offered through the public marketplaces, which were first introduced in 2014, were projected to grow at similar rates.(3) However, from 2014-2016, both premium levels and growth rates for marketplace plans were substantially lower than expected. For example, Adler and Ginsburg (2016) Physician networks are even narrower than hospital networks.
Polsky et al. (2016) reports that the average marketplace network contains just 30 percent of local market physicians in 2014. (9) There are three primary mechanisms through which this shift to narrow provider networks may be contributing to lower premiums. First, insurers may realize lower total medical spending by identifying and contracting only with providers who are "efficient" -that is, who agree to low reimbursement rates or who generate medical savings by performing only necessary services and utilizing the lowest-cost, appropriate sites of care for those services). (10) In their 2016 study of the impact of narrow network plans on spending and utilization, Gruber and McKnight (2016) find evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
State employees induced by a "premium holiday" to join a narrow network plan increased (arguably efficient) primary care spending and decreased (arguably inefficient) specialist spending; when these effects were combined, the narrow network plan reduced overall medical spending by 40 percent. (11) (Notably, find that narrow does not necessarily mean low-quality: the average marketplace plan in California included fewer hospitals than the average commercial plan, but the average quality of in-network hospitals was not measurably lower. (12)) Second, narrow-network plans may be able to negotiate lower prices from providers in return for steering more patient volume to them, and then pass these savings on to consumers in the form of lower premiums. Third, the threat of exclusion should motivate providers to become more efficient -which in turn should reduce total medical expenditures and therefore premiums.
To date, researchers have not provided a definitive answer to the question of how much cheaper are narrow-network plans.
McKinsey reports that among silver plans on the marketplaces in 2014, plans with narrow hospital networks were priced 16 percent below "similar" plans with broad hospital networks, and this discount rose to 22 percent by 2016.(8)(13) Polsky et al. (2016) report that among silver plans on the marketplaces in 2014, those with "extra-small" physician networks were priced 6.7 percent below "similar" silver plans with "large" physician networks in 2014. There are a number of potential explanations for these substantially different magnitudes, such as the distinction between physician and hospital networks, and how "similar" plans are defined, underscoring the need for further research.
This study makes a number of contributions beyond prior research, including a related study by Dafny et al. 2015, described below. We consider the effect of both hospital network breadth and physician network breadth on premiums, whereas prior studies have only analyzed one network type at a time. We also construct a more accurate measure of hospital network breadth: rather than taking a count of in-network hospitals in an area, we weight the importance of in-network hospitals based on the volume of inpatient stays at each network hospital by residents of the relevant geographic market. Thus, more popular, conveniently-located, and larger hospitals "count more" in our measure. This is the same measure used in Dafny et al. (2015) , but that study used just one state (Texas) and one year of data (2014), whereas our data spans eight states including 43 percent of the U.S. population.
While other papers have examined the relationship between breadth and premiums, we estimate how narrow network plans have influenced the level of federal subsidies in the marketplaces.
We also estimate the impact of narrow-network plans on federal outlays by using our model to predict premiums if all hospital and physician networks in the eight states we study were required to be "broad" and "large," respectively.
Study Data and Methods

Data resume
We obtained data from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation The hospital discharge data, which we obtained for a single recent year for all eight states, enabled us to construct a utilization-weighted measure of breadth, rather than relying on simple counts of hospitals. We defined "hospital network breadth" for a network in a given rating area to be the number of discharges for patients living in the rating area that occur at "in-network" hospitals divided by the total number of discharges for patients living in the rating area. (20) We imposed a number of sampling restrictions on the discharge datasets when constructing our measure -e.g., limiting to patients aged 18-64 discharged from general acute care hospitals; details are available in the Data Appendix. (21) We used the physician network breadth measure developed and posted by Polsky et al. (2016) . This measure of physician network breadth, available for 85 percent of silver plans in 2014 only, is defined as the number of in-network physicians in a rating area divided by the total number of physicians in the rating area.
Methods
We used observational data to explore the impact of narrownetwork plans on marketplace premiums and federal premium subsidies. We lack a quasi-experimental design, so our results are suggestive rather than conclusive. However, we gathered and controlled for a large set of factors that jointly impact both network breadth and premiums, so as to reduce the potential sources of bias in our estimates. To aid us in that endeavor, we began by analyzing statistics on the prevalence of narrow network plans and the factors correlated with network breadth.
Next, we examined the relationship between network breadth (for both hospitals and physicians) and premiums using multivariate regressions. The goal of these analyses was to understand how network breadth affects premiums holding all else equal. Such estimates allowed us to consider (under admittedly stylized assumptions) alternative scenarios, such as the impact on premiums if all insurers offered full network products.
Of course, plans with different network breadths may differ in a number of other ways as well, including cost-sharing characteristics (e.g., deductible and coinsurance rates), plan type (e.g., HMO versus PPO), reputation of the insurance carrier, and utilization patterns and costs in the relevant rating area. Failing to account for these other factors can produce misleading estimates -for example, if network breadth tends to be lower in urban areas, and average prices are lower in these areas as well, then the link between narrowness and premiums will be overstated.
In deciding how to control for potentially confounding factors, we faced a trade-off between omitting potentially important controls, and including so many that our estimates ultimately rely upon a very small share of the data. At the first extreme, we might have included cross-sectional covariates to capture market, insurer, and plan characteristics, but allowed for differences in network breadth and premiums across insurers and markets to contribute to our estimates. At the second extreme, we might have added indicator variables for every rating area-insurer-plan type combination, and thus estimated the effect of network breadth on premiums using only variation within the same insurer, offering the same plan type, in the same rating area. In this case, we would be using only a small portion of the data, limiting the external generalizability of our findings.
We adopted an intermediate approach in our regression models, and included separate indicator variables for each insurer-plan type combination and each insurer-rating area combination. Appendix 2 presents a number of additional details explaining these selections, and includes the results of robustness tests.(21)
Limitations
As noted above, our analysis is descriptive, relying on associations between premiums and breadth measures to infer the role of network breadth in premium-setting. Although we were able to control for many factors that would generate bias in estimating the relationship of interest, we cannot establish a causal effect of changes in breadth on premiums, nor can we detect the mechanisms generating the estimate we obtain.
Another limitation of our analysis is that our sample covers roughly 43 percent of U.S. states, by population, but may not be representative of the rest of the country. Appendix 3 presents additional analysis on the external generalizability of our results.(21) We note that our sample is tilted towards more populous and geographically larger states. These states contain some of the largest cities in the US, where -as we show belownarrow networks are more prevalent. Thus, our summary statistics likely overestimate their prevalence nationwide.
We also caution that the marketplaces are relatively new and turbulent markets. There are a number of reasons that analyses using 2014-2015 data may not be predictive of trends in future years, including demand-side factors such as evolving tastes for different plan designs, supply-side factors such as changes in the number of participating insurers, and policy factors such as the magnitude of subsidies, the definition of "essential health benefits," and the presence of an individual mandate.
Study Results
Where are Narrow Networks Offered?
We begin by presenting detailed information on the markets in which narrow network plans tend to appear, the plan "types" featuring narrow networks, and the relationship between hospital and physician network breadth. We stratify our data across four characteristics of markets or plans: rating area population, plan type, whether a plan affects federal subsidies (i.e., is one of the two lowest priced plans), and year (2014 or 2015).
For each of these characteristics, Exhibit 1 reports the mean and median of network breadth, as well as the share of networks which are "full," i.e., include all providers. We present these statistics for both hospital and physician network breadth, noting that physician network breadth is only available in 2014. 
Relationship between Network Breadth and Premiums
We We caution that our calculation of counterfactual subsidies is highly speculative, as the correlations that we measure may not reflect a causal relationship between subsidies and provider network breadth. Furthermore, these results should not be taken as a prediction of the effects of a "broad network" mandate because such a mandate would affect provider-insurer bargaining positions in ways our model does not capture. (Given that the marketplaces are so small, this shortcoming is not as severe as it would be if the hypothetical mandate were to extend to the entire commercially-insured population, but the inability to threaten exclusion from networks could result in substantially higher prices even for this segment of the insurance market.)
In addition, it's important to note that lower premiums do not necessarily imply a "better deal" for subsidy-eligible enrollees. To the extent that such plans drive the second-lowest silver premium down, they reduce subsidies for eligible exchange enrollees, and increase the out-of-pocket premium for higherpriced plans.
Implications and Conclusion
Narrow provider networks have proven to be a contentious This dynamic may lead to the premature exit of broad network plans -particularly in the marketplaces, whose enrollees are price-sensitive -if they cannot achieve competitive pricing in short order. The disparity in pricing at the outset leads only those enrollees who place a high value on broad networks to pay for broad plans, and these enrollees are likely to be in worse than average health (e.g., because they wish to retain current providers who may be excluded from a given narrow network). The result is an ever-growing disparity in average spending for enrollees in narrow vs. broad plans.
Absent perfect risk-adjustment, a "death spiral" may unfold, whereby broad-network plans raise premiums to cover increasing costs, causing the healthiest of their remaining enrollees to switch to less expensive plans, raising average costs even more.
As this process repeats, broad network plans could become so expensive that they are no longer offered. where Bi is the coefficient on the relevant network breadth measure and d is the change in network breadth described above for hospitals and physicians (in the case of simultaneous change, the exponentiated term is the sum of the products of the individual coefficients and the change in network breadth). All results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Regression coefficients and other statistics for this model as well as separate models using only hospital network breadth and only physician network breadth, and a model using 2015 data are available in the appendix. 
